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Abstract 
 
We explore what institutional entrepreneurs do to propagate new organizational forms. Our 
findings are derived from a longitudinal study of the ‘Euroregion’, an organizational form used by 
local authorities situated close to European borders for co-ordinating policies across borders. We 
find that the institutional entrepreneurs behind the Euroregion engaged in several types of 
institution-building projects, with a changing focus over time. While the initial emphasis was on 
interactional projects, this was followed by a focus on technical projects and finally cultural 
projects. The skills the institutional entrepreneurs deployed changed accordingly. While in a first 
phase predominantly political skills were used, later analytical skills and finally cultural skills 
were added. Furthermore, the institutional entrepreneurs propagated the organizational form by 
switching their institution-building projects between different fields. We interpret these findings 
by outlining a process theory of institutional entrepreneurship that conceptualises the institutional 
entrepreneur in light of its development as an innovating organization.  
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Introduction  
The question of how organizational forms emerge and spread is a central in organizational theory 
(Stinchcombe 1965). An organizational form is a composite of goals of the organization, its 
authority relations, the technology it uses, and the markets it seeks to serve (Scott 1999). We 
know that new organizational forms diffuse when they become accepted as legitimate ways of 
organizing within a particular field (Aldrich and Fiol 1994). Recent work has suggested that this 
occurs due to the work of institutional entrepreneurs (Rao, Morrill and Zald 2000; Greenwood 
and Suddaby 2006). A number of recent studies have examined the characteristics of institutional 
entrepreneurship (Garud, Jain and Kumaraswamy 2002; Rao 1998; Greenwood and Suddaby 
2006; Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence 2004).  
However, there is a significant degree of uncertainty about what exactly institutional 
entrepreneurs do when they propagate new organizational forms. Do they predominantly engage 
in political activity (Stinchcombe 1965), ‘theorization’ to justify a new organizational form 
(Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings 2002), or ‘framing’ to appeal to broader discourses (Rao 
1998)? This lack of clarity is matched by uncertainty about the skills required by institutional 
entrepreneurs even though recent work has emphasised that institutional work is generally carried 
out by competent actors (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). Finally, institutional entrepreneurs act in 
various field conditions, ranging from emerging fields (Maguire et al 2004) to mature fields 
(Greenwood and Suddaby 2006). These studies have examined how field contexts shape and 
enable the activities of institutional entrepreneurs yet they have put less emphasis on the way the 
entrepreneurs manipulate their field contexts and positions as part of their actions.  
In this article, we present the results of a study to shed more light on these aspects of institutional 
entrepreneurship. The case we explore allows us to analyse what institutional entrepreneurs do to 
create and propagate a new organizational form, the skills they deploy, and how they relate to 
 4
their field contexts during their efforts. We study the inception and diffusion of an organizational 
form called the ‘Euroregion’. Euroregions are used by European local authorities situated near 
national borders for co-ordinating policies with their counterparts across the border. Tracing this 
organizational form over a period of fifty years allows us to examine activities, skills and field 
contexts at various points in time, and hence emphasize the process dimension of institutional 
entrepreneurship. Our analysis suggests institutional entrepreneurship is not limited to critical 
junctures or crises but can stretch far into the diffusion stages of institutional emergence.  
We begin by reviewing existing research on institutional entrepreneurship. We show that there is 
little clarity about what exactly institutional entrepreneurs do, the skills they deploy and how they 
engage with their field. We then introduce the case of the Euroregion and trace the process by 
which it became an established institution. We subsequently present our findings and conclude by 
outlining the implications for how we theorize institutional entrepreneurship as a time-based 
process.  
Institutional Entrepreneurship 
As imprints of basic structural features that remain relatively constant over time (Stinchcombe 
1965), organizational forms are a particular kind of institution. Institutions are taken-for-granted 
‘cultured-cognitive, normative and regulative elements that … provide stability and meaning to 
social life’ (Scott, 1999: 48). The study of institutions has largely focused on how institutions 
exert stabilizing influence on social processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). A more recent body 
of work has explored how institutions change (Zucker 1977; DiMaggio 1988; Leblecici, Salanick, 
Copy and King 1991). This has led to an increasing attention to specific actors in institutional 
change, called institutional entrepreneurs (Eisenstadt 1980; DiMaggio 1988; Colomy 1998; Rao 
1998; Garud et al.; 2002; Dorado 2005). Institutional entrepreneurs are actors who work towards 
changing or creating institutions by engaging in forward-looking ‘projective agency’ (Dorado, 
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2005). This involves ‘the imaginative generation by actors of possible future trajectories of 
action’ (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 971), providing the ‘content’ for change processes 
(Colomy 1998). By doing this, they propose a ‘remedy’ to vital problems or societal needs 
(Colomy 1998).  
Recent scholarship has sought to explore in more detail the actual activities involved in 
institutional entrepreneurship (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). Yet the broader literature on 
institutional entrepreneurship remains divided as to exactly what projects institutional 
entrepreneurs are engaged in. According to some authors, institutional entrepreneurs specialize in 
interactional projects. They engage in coalition-building, bargaining and incentivizing other 
actors to gather support for their project, thereby mobilizing and leveraging resources for their 
operations (DiMaggio 1998, Dorado 2005). This emphasis is exemplified by Leiblebici et al’s 
(1991) study of the creation of the modern radio station in the US. They find this organizational 
form gained acceptance by institutional entrepreneurs using political tactics such as building new 
networks of co-operation and association. A second view highlights technical projects in which 
institutional entrepreneurs engage in ‘theorization’ by identifying ‘abstract categories and the 
formulation of patterned relationships such as chains of cause and effect’ (Strang and Meyer 
1993: 492). Processes of theorization were found to be central in the transformation of Canadian 
accounting firms towards multi-professional firms (Greenwood et al 2002). This change was 
precipitated by a professional association identifying pressing problems, offering abstracted 
solutions, and providing moral justifications.  
Finally, cultural projects involve institutional entrepreneurs framing institutions in ways that 
appeal to wider audiences (Rao 1998, Creed, Scully and Austin 2002; Lounsbury, Ventresca and 
Hirsch 2003). Frames are cultural schema that justify an organizing template, and define the 
‘grievances and interests of aggrieved constituencies, diagnose causes, assign blame, provide 
solutions, and enable collective attribution… ’ (Rao 1998: 917). Framing creates links between 
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institutions and deeply embedded popular discourses (Creed et al 2002, Lounsbury et al 2003). 
The power of framing is exemplified in Rao’s (1998) case study on the diffusion of consumer 
watchdog organizations. Institutional entrepreneurs were able to propagate this novel 
organizational form by appealing to popular discourses such as efficiency, scientific analysis, 
rationality, and impartiality.  
If institutional entrepreneurs engage in different kinds of projects, then different kinds of skills 
might be required. Fligstein (1997) identifies ‘social skills’, defined as the ‘ability to induce co-
operation in others’, as an essential characteristic of institutional entrepreneurs. This involves the 
use of various tactics, including the exertion of authority, agenda setting, framing, bricolage, 
bargaining and brokering. While some of these tactics deploy symbolic and discursive work, 
others consist in brokering connections between actors while yet others refer to the re-ordering of 
cognitive templates.  
Against this all-encompassing notion of social skill, recent research has proposed more fine-
grained accounts of the skills used by institutional entrepreneurs. In their study of technical 
standards, Garud et al. (2002) point to the importance of political skills for the maintenance of an 
institution, such as skills in networking, bargaining and interest mediation. Others have suggested 
that institutional entrepreneurs are able to reflect on established practices and envision alternative 
modes of achieving their goals (Beckert 1999). This involves the use of analytical skills such as 
developing abstract models of an institution (Strang and Meyer, 1993). Finally, institutional 
entrepreneurs are also seen to require cultural skills, allowing them to frame issues by referencing 
broader values, building into specific normative attitudes and creating common identities (Ansell 
1997). Skills are typically embodied in individuals but can be collectively represented within 
specific organizations, professions or communities of practice. For instance, technocrats or 
analysts would have analytical skills, while various symbolic managers such as public relations 
experts or politicians would excel in cultural skills (Campbell 2004). 
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Finally, projects of institutional entrepreneurship are shaped and constrained by their field 
context. Fields are sets of organizations that ‘constitute an area of institutional life; key suppliers, 
resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar 
services or products’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 148-149). The degree of institutionalization of 
a field has been highlighted as a factor shaping institutional entrepreneurship (Fligstein 1996; 
Hensmans 2003). A field is highly institutionalized if it has a stable set of rules, norms and 
cognitive schemas that define accepted ways of operating. Such mature fields are often 
characterized by the presence of field-dominating organizations and a dominant organizational 
form (Greenwood et al. 2002). They offer fewer opportunities for change efforts than new, 
declining or crisis-ridden fields (Fligstein, 1996). Thus, both new and declining fields are likely to 
be populated by competing ‘challengers’ advocating different organizational forms (Hensmans 
2003; Rao et al 2000; Seo and Creed 2002). Perhaps reflecting favourable conditions, many 
empirical studies of institutional entrepreneurship have in fact focused on emerging fields 
(Maguire et al 2004; Lawrence and Phillips 2004). Yet, in other cases, institutional entrepreneurs 
have successfully acted from within mature settings (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006). This could 
indicate the existence of differing strategies of institutional entrepreneurship that have so far 
remained unexplored.  
While the literature has made considerable progress to understand institutional entrepreneurship, 
we aim to address several open questions in our case study. As we have argued, there is ambiguity 
as to what types of projects institutional entrepreneurs engage in. Our first research question 
therefore asks what projects the institutional entrepreneur pursued in their efforts to propagate a 
new organizational form. The second question we explore addresses the issue of skills: Which 
skills did the institutional entrepreneur deploy when it attempted to propagate a new 
organizational form? Finally, in view of the uncertainty about the role of the field environment, 
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our third question is: How did field maturity shape the way institutional entrepreneurship was 
conducted?  
Site and Method 
Site selection  
To examine the dynamics of institutional entrepreneurship, we investigated the emergence and 
diffusion of new organizational form – the Euroregion. A Euroregion is characterized by the 
following features. Its goal is to co-ordinate policies among contiguous local or regional 
authorities across national borders in Europe. It typically focuses on developing common regional 
infrastructures, providing municipal services, promoting economic activity, and lobbying central 
government. It is governed via semi-formal relationships among the member municipalities, using 
a mixture of consensual network relationships and European Union (EU) regulations to co-
ordinate decision-making. Its ‘technology’ is a unique adaptation of national and EU-wide public 
administrative regulations and private law contracts. Its ‘market’ is constituted by the local 
authorities and their populations in the areas which make up the border region.  
A case study approach suited our goal to contribute to theory development via analytical 
generalization (Yin 2003). At the outset we searched for the key actors behind the 
institutionalization of the Euroregion. Information derived from interviews, historic accounts and 
policy documentation led us to identify the EUREGIO as the central institutional entrepreneur, for 
several reasons. First, it was the first Euroregion and hence served as a ‘pilot project’ for this 
organizational form. Second, the EUREGIO served as an important reference point for other 
Euroregions (i23). It lead most of the initiatives aimed at propagating the new organizational form 
– for instance the Committee on Local Authorities at the Council of Europe in the 1960s. Finally, 
the EUREGIO was the driving force behind the Association of European Border Regions 
(AEBR), an interest organization that played a substantial part in propagating the Euroregion 
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model. Organizationally, the EUREGIO and the AEBR were closely aligned, sharing 
headquarters and some employees. Accordingly, the unit of analysis for our investigation is the 
EUREGIO/AEBR twin organization which we treat as institutional entrepreneur. We chose to 
focus on organizations, and not individuals, because we were specifically interested in exploring 
how organizations who ‘inhabit’ a novel institutional template work towards diffusing this 
template towards wider audiences. We acknowledge that at the early stages of the process the 
EUREGIO was still emerging as an organization. Yet we believe this does not invalidate our 
results as we view this organization-building process as a necessary phase for generating an 
institutional innovation for which the organization claimed ownership and pursued diffusion.  
 
Data collection  
The analysis is based on two sets of data. A first set consists of 23 semi-structured interviews with 
Dutch and German individuals involved in the EUREGIO, the AEBR and EU regional policy. 
Some interviewees had worked in this context for up to three decades and were therefore able to 
provide a great deal of historic detail. First, we spoke to officials from the EUREGIO and AEBR 
to learn about the inner workings of these organizations and their history. Secondly, we 
interviewed officials from member municipalities to learn about the operation of the EUREGIO 
as local broker. Thirdly, we asked officials representing the EU and the German and Dutch central 
governments about the EUREGIO/AEBR’s field-wide activities. Interviews lasted 1.5 hours on 
average and were taped and transcribed. They are referenced by codes (i1, i2, …) as listed in the 
appendix.  
An equally important body of evidence was provided by archival material including strategy and 
planning documents, reports, public communication materials and meeting minutes produced by 
the EUREGIO, its member authorities, the European Commission, the AEBR, the ILS research 
institute in North-Rhine Westphalia, and other organizations. Some documents date back to the 
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1960s and 1970s and provided insights into the organizational dynamics and strategies at different 
points in time. We also consulted historic accounts provided by Schack (1998) and Goinga 
(1995).  
Data analysis  
We began by generating a narrative account of the emergence and evolution of the EUREGIO and 
its associated lobbying organization, the AEBR. This enabled us to synthesize a chronological list 
of key events judged important by the participants within their written and oral accounts. We only 
considered events that could be attributed to EUREGIO activities, and excluded exogenously 
caused events. We could therefore use these events as a proxy to infer preceding activities 
pursued by the EUREGIO and its associates.  
We then analysed all events and coded them with specific items associated with the categories of 
project, skill and field (see Table 1). Because we were aware that none of the data could be 
reduced exclusively to one item (e.g. a purely ‘interactional’ project), we chose to determine the 
aspects that appeared most pronounced in informing an event. By using our categories as 
analytical representations, we attempted to make sense of complex empirical data (Rich, 1992). 
To improve internal validity, each of us coded the events independently. For differently 
interpreted items, we went back to the data and intersubjectively negotiated the coding.  
 
Table 1 About Here 
 
We coded projects according to what the actors actually had to do to cause an event in question. 
To this purpose, we used the EUREGIO outcomes at certain junctures as a proxy for the type of 
project the actors had engaged in. If an event was the establishment of an association involving 
previously unconnected actors, we reasoned that the type of project involved was interactional in 
nature. If an event was the publication of a study, we assumed that the underlying activities had 
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been technical projects. Events that were outcomes from attempts to associate Euroregions with 
broader sets of values were coded as cultural projects.  
We extracted the type of skills involved in what the EUREGIO was doing at different points in 
time. As we had no direct information on the actual skills present within the organization, we 
inferred the skills from the professional background of those individuals primarily responsible for 
achieving certain outcomes. This included individuals within the EUREGIO organization as well 
as external assistance enlisted by the EUREGIO. For instance, if a research institute was 
commissioned we reasoned that this was because the EUREGIO required analytical skills. If the 
individuals involved were primarily senior civil servants, this meant political skills were 
deployed. Finally, the use of ‘framers’ (Campbell 2004) such as lobbyists and media experts 
indicated cultural skills.  
As we had indications that the EUREGIO was active in several fields, we explored its field 
context at different points by first determining whether an event had a field-wide impact or 
whether it was of merely local relevance. For all field-wide events we then determined which 
field was most relevant for informing an event. To identify and differentiate fields, we adapted the 
above definition of fields to this specific public sector case. A policy field can accordingly be 
defined as a set of dominant policy-makers, policy addressees and constituencies, as well as 
public and private organizations engaging in advisory, technical and advocacy activities. Using 
this definition to identify fields, we were able to code events according to which fields were 
mainly affected. 
To establish regularities over times, we used a simple periodization technique. We divided our 
time line of events into five-year periods to identify concentrations of specific event attributes at 
specific periods. For instance, to decide which projects were relevant for the institutional 
entrepreneurs at specific points in time, we counted the number of times a specific project type 
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appeared within each five-year sub-period. Without taking the results for granted in a pseudo-
objectivist manner that would be inappropriate for this type of data, we used this as a heuristic for 
understanding time-based regularities. 
Case study background  
After 1945, many border areas in Europe faced significant development problems as they lacked 
infrastructures and market access opportunities due to the barrier effects exerted by borders. The 
Dutch-German border area was no exception to this (Goinga 1995: 20). To address these 
economic problems, small regional alliances of local authorities formed, two on the Dutch side 
and one on the German side. At first informal and later formalized, these inter-municipal 
associations addressed issues such as the restructuring in the textile sector, the improvement of 
transport infrastructures and the solicitation of resources from central government (Malchus 
1972). From the 1950s onwards, cross-border contacts among the associations intensified as they 
decided to collaborate on specific issues regardless of their national affiliation. This occurred 
despite the fact that there was no existing legal or administrative template to pursue such cross-
border work.  
Such issue-focused cross-border co-operation slowly congealed into an organization, the 
EUREGIO. A board (the ‘Working Group’) was established in 1966, a commission for cultural 
cross-border initiatives in 1970, followed by secretariats, initially separately on each side of the 
border.  
The EUREGIO also started to engage with other similar co-operation experiments across Europe. 
The main ‘target’ of this informal transnational interest group was the Council of Europe (CoE), a 
supranational European body unrelated to the EU that was leading efforts to create an integrated 
Europe. The CoE had a transnational parliamentary assembly that provided an arena for local 
authority interests.  
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A series of studies and reports were carried out to substantiate the EUREGIO model. While a 
1970 report focused on socio-cultural co-operation, in 1971 an economic ‘structural analysis’ was 
carried out with funding from the European Commission and German and Dutch ministries. The 
study proposed a bundle of measures for an integrated cross-border programme (Malchus 1972). 
It concluded that the Euroregion model should form part of a future EU regional policy, and that 
this required the further development of the existing model.  
While pursuing this policy strategy work, the EUREGIO became increasingly consolidated as an 
organization. In the mid-seventies, a formal statute was agreed, and in 1978 the EUREGIO 
Council was established as the first cross-border regional parliamentary assembly in Europe. In 
1985, the administrative offices were merged into a single secretariat. It had achieved 
respectability within the local environment and became a ‘natural part’ of the day-to-day activities 
in local public administration (i9, i12). 
Efforts had continued on the international level. In 1971, the trans-European interest group then 
comprising nine members was formalized as the ‘Association of European Border Regions’ 
(AEBR). A leading EUREGIO figure became its first president. Via the AEBR, the EUREGIO 
had decisive impact on the further substantiation of the cross-border region model, subsequently 
baptized ‘Euroregion’. It approached the CoE to sponsor two ‘border region’ conferences, held in 
1972 and 1975. For each event, a report recommending further courses of action was prepared by 
a renowned North Rhine-Westphalia spatial planner and advisor to the EUREGIO (Malchus 
1972; 1975).  
The mobilization of scientific expertise continued to be an important part of the AEBR’s 
activities. Many of the conceptual elements of Euroregions were later integrated in manuals 
handed out to border authorities all over Europe interested in initiating such co-operation. With 
AEBR support, in 1980 the CoE approved an international treaty on trans-border co-operation. 
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This so-called Madrid Convention formalized many of the features of Euroregions elaborated by 
the AEBR and de facto already practiced in lead cases such as the EUREGIO. 
As the relevance of the EU had increased from 1975 onwards, the AEBR began to focus its 
efforts more strongly on the EU. In 1988, the European Commission provided funding to the 
EUREGIO to ‘pilot’ a bundle of cross-border measures. Based on this pilot project, in 1990 the 
EU launched a major programme, ‘Interreg’, designed to support Euroregions as part of EU 
regional policy. As a result, more and more Euroregions began to appear across Europe (Figure 
1), modelled after the EUREGIO. The AEBR had been closely involved in the design of Interreg 
and its pilot predecessors (i16; European Commission 1999).  
Alongside this, the ABER established an ‘observatory’ called ‘Linkage Assistance and 
Cooperation for European Border Regions’ (LACE), funded by the EU commission. LACE was 
designed to provide consulting to local authorities new to the Euroregion model. A ‘scientific 
committee’ was formalized as a ‘think tank’ in cross-border co-operation matters, and periodical 
publications were launched. So-called ‘antennae’ were established in various areas across Europe 
as organizational relay stations between the AEBR and the local actors in the European border 
areas. The EUREGIO/AEBR actors had succeeded in popularising the use of the ‘Euroregion’ 
organizational form among countless local and regional authorities across Europe.  
 
Figure 1 About Here  
 
Analysis and findings  
Projects  
Our first research question was what projects institutional entrepreneurs pursue to generate and 
propagate a new organizational form. Applying our coding scheme to the data, we found that the 
EUREGIO actors engaged in a variety of projects.  
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A first type of projects consisted of interactional projects which were aimed at bringing actors 
together who were not previously connected. For instance, this included the establishment of 
networks among a number of municipalities in the early period of the EUREGIO. The resulting 
collective action platforms pursued common interests such as promoting economic development 
and lobbying for better transport links. Their main objective was to mobilize resources from 
external agencies such as national governments. For instance, the coalition influenced a national 
motorway project so that it would connect the EUREGIO area with the wider transport network 
(i6). Further interactional projects included efforts to manage the collective action platform by 
increasing its organizational capacity. This became a ‘crystallizing organization’ (Rao 1998) 
representing the interests of the network of members. Negotiations were held as to how the 
organization was to be funded, resulting in the introduction of a membership fee, voluntarily 
agreed by the members of the participating network.   
These interactional projects were significant because they challenged existing institutionalized 
routines. While establishing collective action among municipalities within national contexts was 
common practice, cross-border linkages were new. This was indicated by the fact that they had to 
resort to ‘unorthodox’ methods. One interviewee stated: ‘The German partners accounted for 
public expenses on Dutch territory which not strictly speaking legal … Yet they all felt they were 
acting in the common interest and hence nobody contested this practice’ (i6). The participants 
realized that forming a cross-border coalition (and hence going beyond existing practice) would 
improve their advocacy impact on central government and European agencies.  
Separately, the EUREGIO also pursued technical projects aimed at conceptualising the way it 
operated as an organization. The EUREGIO sought to differentiate itself from another model for 
organising cross-border co-operation propagated across Europe. In contrast to these ‘Working 
Communities’ (Perkmann 1999), the EUREGIO model allowed municipalities, as opposed to 
larger regional authorities, to participate in border space management (Malchus 1972: 50). As no 
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legal framework for such international ‘grass-roots’ co-operation existed, the EUREGIO focused 
on constructing a robust model. It addressed the questions as to what legal framework should be 
adopted, how strategizing should be conducted and how resources could be accessed. It also 
meant engineering the Euroregion’s fit with its local and supra-local contexts. Finally, it involved 
charting the expected impact of a Euroregion vis-à-vis alternative organizational forms. In the 
words of one early participant, this had to include ‘a better way of managing public funds spent 
for developing borders areas and creating integrated cross-border economic spaces as growth 
hubs’ (i2). These elements were generated in a series of studies and action programmes published 
by the EUREGIO in 1970, 1971 and 1987.  
The evidence suggests that the EUREGIO also engaged in cultural projects by linking the novel 
‘cross-border region’ entity to wider values and norms. Firstly, the EUREGIO and its AEBR 
international branch lobbied the European Commission to launch an EU-wide policy programme 
(Interreg) designed to support cross-border regions. They argued that cross-border regions were 
coherent with the overall values and objectives of EU regional policies. The success of this 
strategy was indicated by the fact that within successive versions of Interreg, the model for 
organizing cross-border regions recommended within the programme became increasingly similar 
to the one pioneered by the EUREGIO (i17). To support this policy change, the AEBR presented 
its case to politicians in the European Parliament by framing the Euroregion within the wider 
discourse of European integration: Euroregions were presented as constituting European 
integration on a ‘small scale’ and building a Europe ‘from below’ (Goinga 1995). These activities 
of the AEBR were so successful that border regions were explicitly mentioned in the text of the 
European Constitutional Treaty in 2004.  
The EUREGIO also sought to popularize the Euroregion among local politicians and civil 
servants. An ‘observatory’ with branches at various European locations was established. 
EUREGIO and AEBR representatives sought out speaking and consulting engagements across 
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Europe. An AEBR report states that between 1990 and 1994 eighty workshops were held 
involving 6,750 participants, and sixty reports were published with a total circulation of 60,000. 
In many of these activities, Euroregions were framed as an important element of deepening 
European Integration. Its benefits were represented as going far beyond its technical superiority as 
a cross-border agency for implementing structural policies in border areas. Euroregions were seen 
as ‘healing the scars of history [i.e. borders]’, ‘reducing the risk of armed conflicts’ (i6) and 
accomplishing ‘a first step towards the unification of European states’ (Partl 1986: 90). By 
framing Euroregions in this way, the EUREGIO infused a technical model with the broader 
values of European integration.  
Our findings demonstrate the multiplicity of the projects pursued by the EUREGIO actors. In 
addition, we also found time-related regularities. Applying our periodization technique to the type 
of projects pursued at specific points in time, we found that in the first ten years (1954-1964) 
predominantly interactional projects were pursued (Figure 2). By contrast, for each of the three 
five-year periods from 1965 onwards, at least half of the key events were the result of 
predominantly technical projects while the other half remained predominantly interactional. 
Finally, while interactional and technical projects continued to be present in varying degrees, 
from 1990 onwards we note a stronger presence of predominantly cultural projects.  
 
Figure 2 About Here  
 
We conclude that the efforts to propagate a new organizational form involved several types of 
projective agency. We found evidence that the EUREGIO engaged in interactional, technical as 
well as cultural projects. Moreover, we note that different types of projects appear to be 
prominent at different points in time. Initially the focus was on interactional projects such as 
building networks and coalitions. Then the EUREGIO focused on technical projects such as 
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building a formal model of the Euroregion organizational form while later the focus was on 
cultural projects such as framing the organizational form within wider popular discourses on 
European integration.  
Skills 
Alongside the types of projects, we explored the skills deployed in this episode of institutional 
entrepreneurship. We used the background of individuals driving specific projects to identify 
skills used at varying points in time. In the period dominated by interactional projects, the main 
protagonists were senior civil servants at key municipalities. As one of our interviewees noted: ‘It 
was civil servants who started cross-border co-operation; the politicians only joined them later … 
’ (i5). These early initiators contested existing administrative templates (purely national municipal 
associations) and convinced others that this was in the common interest. The underpinning skills 
are political skills in that they involved the ability to form networks, broker interests and mobilize 
resources (Garud et al, 2002). Even though the main actors were senior civil servants, who 
subsequently enlisted their politician superiors, they acted politically in the sense that they went 
beyond what administrative routines prescribed.  
The institutional entrepreneurs also relied on the skill sets of social scientists and policy 
specialists, i.e. skills typically embodied in specific professional communities (Strang and Meyer 
1993). These skills were acquired by establishing links with spatial planners at ILS, a spatial 
planning research institute in Dortmund, Germany, and technical staff at the CoE and the EU. 
They assisted the EUREGIO in formally modelling and theorizing the institution. For instance, a 
report by the spatial planner, Malchus (1972: 131), criticized inter-governmental commissions for 
actually inhibiting local border region development, and called for the creation of a ‘new 
organizational form’ to inform local initiatives.  
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Finally, the EUREGIO also relied on cultural skills for framing the institution in a way that 
appealed to a wider audience of potential supporters and adopters (Ansell 1997). This is 
demonstrated by the fact that it began to enlist ‘framers’ (Campbell 2004). For instance, in 1990s, 
the newly established LACE unit in Brussels relied on people with a background in lobbying and 
press communications (i18). External consultants were employed to translate the EUREGIO’s 
material into a manual of cross-border communication (i8).  
Analysing the temporal succession of skills deployed by the EUREGIO, we note an increasing 
complexity of skill sets used over time. While in an early stage, the skills underlying key events 
were predominantly political, later the EUREGIO increasingly enlisted analytical and cultural 
skills. Dividing the event history into ten five-year periods, the EUREGIO began using technical 
skills only significantly from the fourth period onwards, while significant cultural skills were 
being deployed from period seven onwards.  
In sum, we found that the institutional entrepreneurs deployed a variety of skills which can be 
synthesized into three categories: political, analytical and cultural. Moreover, we detected a 
temporal regularity analogue to our finding on projects: while initially the emphasis was on 
political skills, later technical and subsequently cultural skills were increasingly prominent.   
Fields  
Our coding revealed three field contexts in which the actors operated: the field of 
intergovernmental relationships (i.e. between Germany and the Netherlands), the field dominated 
by the CoE, and the field dominated by the EU. These are distinct policy fields with different 
dominant policy makers and policy addressees, but also diverse regulatory environments, resource 
logics and administration cultures. The EU and CoE were both European-wide policy fields yet 
they constituted the focus of distinct European integration ‘industries’ – the CoE favouring 
politico-legal integration, the EU economic integration. Our analysis of key events shows (Table 
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1) that there is brief focus on German-Dutch intergovernmental relationships in the early 
seventies, followed by increasing attempts to work with the CoE. Finally, from the mid-eighties 
onwards the EUREGIO almost exclusively focused on the EU. In the following, we provide an 
interpretation of these patterns.  
Initially, widening its focus from local experiments, the EUREGIO positioned itself in the context 
of German-Dutch inter-governmental relationships. It attempted to play a stronger role in a field 
of inter-state co-ordination that was dominated by so-called ‘inter-governmental commissions’. 
These bodies had little contact with local actors yet were responsible for managing border spaces. 
For instance, the EUREGIO managed to carve out a role for itself in the area of cross-border 
spatial planning (i6).  
In the 1950s and 1960s, the CoE was an important player engaged in driving European 
integration, and the EUREGIO was seeking to add cross-border co-operation to its agenda. It 
lobbied specific CoE commissions dealing with local matters, and was later involved in drafting 
the ‘Madrid Convention’ among European nations aimed at formally instituting cross-border 
regions. Yet, the convention remained rather toothless, as a EUREGIO functionary confirmed: 
‘The convention was a tragedy. It damaged our relationship with the CoE and we decided to move 
on with our agenda …’ (i5).  
In the meantime, the EU had risen as a well-funded competitor to the CoE’s integration project. 
The EU launched ‘regional policies’ addressed at marginalized territories, and the EUREGIO 
actors re-oriented their field-wide efforts. They took advantage of several grants to carry out 
studies in the 1970s and 1980s and over time re-aligned their model to fit the EU’s requirements 
for receiving policy support. Simultaneously, the EU asked the EUREGIO to assist in drafting 
specific policies to support cross-border policies, as documented by a series of policy strategy 
papers co-authored by AEBR and EU.  
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These patterns reinforce the view that emerging fields offer considerable scope for institutional 
entrepreneurship (Lawrence, 1999), particularly for smaller marginal players (Fligstein 1996; 
Hensmans 2003; Maguire et al 2004). We note, however, that the promoters of the Euro-region 
repeatedly and systematically sought out new and expanding fields. Once a field showed signs of 
maturity or relative decline, the champions of the Euroregion ‘moved’ to newly emerging fields 
offering new opportunities. When cross-border co-operation policy was relatively new at the 
nation state level after 1945, their efforts focused here. This changed when the CoE emerged as 
the centre of a major supranational integrationist movement. Finally, when the EU launched its 
regional policy in addition to its original free-trade agenda, the positioning of the Euroregion was 
changed once more. By continuing to address relatively underdeveloped fields, its champions 
ensured their organizational form would insert itself into the agenda of field-dominating 
organizations.  
Summarising, our findings suggest that the maturity of a field placed limits on institutional 
entrepreneurship while emerging fields provided significant opportunities for the EUREGIO to 
pursue its change projects. Our case shows that institutional entrepreneurs can repeatedly capture 
such opportunities via field switching. The promoters of the Euroregion exploited opportunities 
arising in various fields. By selecting emerging fields and adapting the type of solutions they 
could offer other field participants, the institutional entrepreneurs were able to develop their 
model and secure a continuous flow of resources.  
Discussion  
Our findings provide new insights into how institutional entrepreneurs create and propagate new 
organizational forms. Firstly, we clarify what type of projects institutional entrepreneurs 
undertake. While some authors see institutional entrepreneurs as political actors pursing 
interactional projects (DiMaggio 1998), others emphasize technical projects such as theorization 
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(Greenwood et al 2002) while yet others regard them mainly as ‘framers’ engaging in cultural 
projects (Rao 1998; Creed et al 2002; Lounsbury et al 2003). By showing that institutional 
entrepreneurship is a multi-dimensional activity involving each of these three forms of projective 
agency, we provide empirical support for recent accounts pointing to the diversity of ‘institutional 
work’ (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006).  
Secondly, we examined the skills used by institutional entrepreneurs. Existing literature has 
identified a range of such skills, including political skills (Garud et al 2002), analytical skills 
(Beckert 1999), and cultural skills (Ansell 1997). As opposed to singling out specific types of 
skill as a key trait of institutional entrepreneurs (Fligstein 1997), our analysis suggests that they 
are in fact multi-skilled. Finally, we generated new insights into how institutional entrepreneurs 
engage with their field environments. Existing studies suggest the maturity of an organizational 
field as a vital determinant for institutional entrepreneurship. It is claimed that institutional 
entrepreneurs are either dominating actors transforming ‘their’ mature field (Greenwood and 
Suddaby 2006), or marginal actors seeking to influence developments in newly emerging or 
crisis-ridden fields (Fligstein 1996; Hensmans 2003; Maguire et al 2004). Our analysis suggests 
that institutional entrepreneurs can be more opportunistic in their attempts to draw capital from 
the institutional innovations they pioneered. As fields matured and opportunities for influence 
decreased, the EUREGIO actors sought out other relatively young fields. This suggests that while 
institutional entrepreneurs may be constrained by the maturity of a field, they may seek to loosen 
these constraints by seeking to position their projects repeatedly in new fields.  
Our findings have wider implications for how we theorize institutional entrepreneurship. While 
existing work has explored the conditions under which institutional entrepreneurship occurs, as 
well as its impacts on institutions, our knowledge of how it unfolds as a process is incomplete. 
Existing process accounts typically capture what happens to institutions over time, and not the 
agency dimension underlying those processes. For instance, extending Tolbert and Zucker’s 
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model (1996), Greenwood and Hinings (2006) argue that institutionalization involves the stages 
of precipitating jolts, de-institutionalization, pre-institutionalization, theorization, diffusion and 
institutionalization. For them, institutional entrepreneurship occurs primarily during the de-
institutionalization stage. This is consistent with our findings on the early years of the EUREGIO. 
Yet institutional entrepreneurship was also an important part of the later technical elaboration of 
the Euroregion (‘theorization’), and its cultural propagation (‘diffusion’). This suggests it occurs 
in a number of different moments throughout the institutionalization process.  
Importantly, we found that the nature of institutional entrepreneurship changes in a particular 
order as institutionalization proceeds. An initial emphasis on interactional projects was followed 
by an increasing importance of technical and later cultural projects. Institutional entrepreneurship 
can therefore be conceptualized as a multidimensional process where project types and skills are 
successively added to the existing ones over time (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 About Here 
 
To explain why institutional entrepreneurship unfolds over time in this particular way, we 
propose a process model that views the institutional entrepreneur as a developing organisation. 
The first stage involves an organization-building process, driven by a network of actors pursuing 
interests that are not served by using existing institutional forms. They are hence likely to breach 
certain norms and choose novel and unorthodox methods to pursue their goals via ‘mindful 
deviation’ (Garud and Karnøe 2001). Establishing an organization in this way requires 
networking and the mobilization of resources (Aldrich 1979), reflecting our interactional project 
dimension.  
If the local experiment proves successful, the institutional entrepreneur has generated a relatively 
unique organizational ‘template’ that can potentially be deployed to solve certain problems 
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elsewhere. The awareness of the potential value of this template might lead the entrepreneur to 
invest in its further development via conceptual substantiation and formalization. The result is 
that it embarks on technical projects, enabled through the acquisition or sourcing of analytical 
skills.  
In a further stage, the institutional entrepreneur broadens its field-wide activities by promoting the 
diffusion of the proposed model and actively driving isomorphic adoption by other organizations 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This involves presenting the organization as a prototype for further 
replication (Colomy 1998), addressing potential adopters and emphasising adoption benefits not 
unlike a social movement organization (Zald and Ash 1966). In addition, it seeks to influence 
field-dominating agencies and organizations and improve resource-flows towards the novel 
category of organizations. This corresponds to our cultural project dimension, enabled by the 
development or sourcing of cultural skills.  
In such a scenario, field-switching strategies can be explained as the organization’s attempt to 
further the impact of its main asset, i.e. the institutional innovation it developed. If it perceives 
opportunities in other fields, it will attempt to extend or transfer its institutional innovation into 
that field. Demand for an institutional solution might for instance be indicated by the fact that a 
new organizational template can help address issues problematized by actors in other fields 
(Callon 1986).  
Conclusion  
This study helps us paint a more consistent picture of the emergence and spread of new 
organizational forms. We found that this involved a multi-dimensional process of institutional 
entrepreneurship, involving political, technical and cultural projects. Furthermore, each of these 
projects required significantly different skills. Finally, we found that institutional entrepreneurs 
seek to deploy new organizational forms not just in their ‘home fields’ but are able to switch into 
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newly emerging fields to take advantage of institution-building opportunities. Our analysis also 
suggests time-based regularities, involving an initial focus on interactional projects which are 
later complemented by an increased focus on technical and cultural projects, each matched by 
different skill requirements. From this we derived the outline of a process theory of institutional 
entrepreneurship that explains this sequentiality by conceptualising the institutional entrepreneur 
as a developing organization seeking to diffuse an innovation it pioneered.  
While this paper makes some contributions, we would like to acknowledge some limitations of 
our study and highlight fruitful areas of further research. Firstly, our account might be limited to 
the emergence of new organizational forms. Institutional entrepreneurs seeking to change other 
kinds of institutions might mobilize very different projects and skills. Promoters of technical 
standards might first perfect a technology by mobilising their analytical skills before they seek to 
bring people together around that technology using their political skills (Garud et al, 2002). It 
would therefore be interesting to consider whether institutional entrepreneurs seeking to change 
other kinds of institutions deploy projects and skills in the same sequence. Either way, further 
research could also address the conditions that enable the institutional entrepreneur to change 
their emphasis from one type of project towards another one, and to acquire the necessary skills.  
A second limitation is that we focused on a case where the institutional innovators who pioneered 
a new institution were identical with the institutional entrepreneurs who propagated it. In other 
instances, institutional entrepreneurs might appropriate innovations from other actors, and then 
pursue institutionalization (eg. Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). This means while political and 
technical projects would be carried out by others, the institutional entrepreneur would largely 
focus on the cultural project of propagating the institutional innovation. The question therefore is 
how different projects are divided between institutional innovators and institutional entrepreneurs, 
and whether ‘distributed’ institutional entrepreneurship is possible, with some actors specializing 
in undertaking certain projects and mobilizing certain skills.  
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A third limitation of our case is that we focused on an ‘outsider’ rather than a field-dominating 
incumbent. When changes are driven by central actors, there might be less initial emphasis on the 
interactional dimension and more emphasis on the technical dimension. This is because the main 
challenge for an incumbent entrepreneur is to deinstitutionalize entrenched practices via 
theorizing (Greenwood et al 2002). In other situations, the institutional entrepreneur might be 
working against competitors (Colomy 1998) and have to gain widespread acceptance of their 
model through cultural projects before they seek to technically formalize the model. Thus, the 
question is how the field position of institutional entrepreneurs contributes to inform what 
projects and skills they mobilize and their sequential order.  
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Appendix: Interview codes  
i1 Provincie Overijssel, Zwolle (NL)  
i2   Landkreis Grafschaft Bentheim, Nordhorn (DE)  
i3  Ministerie van Economische Zaken, Regio Oost, Arnhem (NL) 
i4   Bezirkregierung Weser-Ems, Oldenburg (DE) 
i5  EUREGIO/AEBR, Gronau (DE) 
i6  Bezirksregierung, Münster (DE)  
i7  Regio Acherhoek (NL) 
i8   EUREGIO, Gronau (DE) 
i9   Landkreis Steinfurt, Steinfurt (DE)  
i10  Investitionsbank Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf (DE)  
i11  Ministry of Economics, North Rhine-Westphalia, Düsseldorf (DE)  
i12  Kreis Borken, Bocholt (DE) 
i13  European Commission, DG16, INTERREG II/c, Brussels (BE) 
i14  European Commission, DG16, INTERREG II, Brussels  
i15 European Commission, DG12, Brussels  
i16 European Commission, DG16, Brussels 
i17  European Commission, DG16, Brussels 
i18 LACE-TAP office, Brussels  
i19 European Commission, DG1, Brussels 
i20 European Commission, DG16, Brussels 
i21  ILS Spatial Planning Institute, Dortmund (DE) 
i22  EUREGIO, Gronau (DE)  
i23  Euroregion Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder (DE) 
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Table 1: Coding of key events  
 
Year Events/Outcomes Project   Skill   Field  
1954 Community of Interests Rhein-Ems (DE) 
established among German municipalities, 
first usage of ‘EUREGIO’ as a name 
I P  Local 
1958 Dutch and German municipalities decide to 
formally pursue cross-border co-operation 
I P  Local 
1960 Belangengemeenschap-Twente-Oost 
Gelderland (NL) established as municipal 
association 
I P  Local 
1961 Foundation Streekbelangen Oost Gelderland" 
(NL) established as municipal association  
I P  Local  
1962 Formal municipal association Rhein-Ems 
succeeds Community of Interest Rhein-Ems 
(DE) 
I P  Local  
1965 First cross-border trade show; EUREGIO 
‘Working Group’ established as permanent 
executive body  
I P  Local  
1966 Committee on Local Authorities: first draft 
for international convention on cross-border 
co-operation  
T A  CoE 
1970 Commission established for co-ordinating co-
operation in cultural matters (with funding 
from central governments)  
I P Inter-Gov
 Study on socio-cultural co-operation, funded 
by German and Dutch governments
T A  Inter-Gov 
1971 Full-time functionaries appointed to lead 
secretariats of  the three member municipal 
associations
I P Local 
 Association of European Border Regions 
(AEBR) founded  during a ceremony in the 
EUREGIO
I P CoE 
 Publication of first cross-border economic T A Inter-Gov 
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policy action programme for the EUREGIO, 
funded by central governments 
1972 AEBR organizes First European Conference 
of Border Regions in Strasbourg 
T A CoE 
1975 EUREGIO Statute ratified by its members   C C Local 
1975 AEBR organizes Second European 
Conference of Border Regions in Innsbruck
T A CoE 
 AEBR Scientific Committee established, 
headed by spatial planner close to EUREGIO 
T A Local 
 AEBR participates in drawing up of a Council 
of Europe convention
T A CoE 
1977 Dutch EUREGIO secretariats merged I P  
1978 Local parliamentary assembly established 
(EUREGIO Council)
I P Local 
1980 Launch of Council of Europe Convention on 
cross-border co-operation
T A CoE 
1981 Establishment of ‘Liaison Office’ in the CoE 
Secretary General's office under participation 
of AEBR  
I P CoE 
1984 AEBR organizes 3rd European Conference of 
Border Regions (at EUREGIO location)
T A CoE 
1985 Dutch and German EUREGIO secretariats 
merged to single agency
I P Local 
 EUREGIO Steering committee established 
with participation of EU and DE/NL 
government agencies’ to elaborate 20-year 
economic development strategy
T A Inter-
Gov, EU 
1987 Cross-border ‘action programme’ for 
EUREGIO presented  
T A  Local 
1989 EUREGIO obtains funding from EU for 
cross-border co-operation pilot programme  
I P  EU 
1990 AEBR establishes ‘Observatory for Cross-
border Co-operation in Europe’ (supported by 
C C  EU 
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EU) 
1991 EUREGIO obtains EU Interreg funds  I P  EU 
 AEBR starts annual series of workshops 
across Europe attended by large number of 
local authority representatives  
C C  EU 
1993 ‘EUREGIO Forum’ established, with 
geographically extended membership, almost 
doubling its size  
I P  EU 
1996 AEBR Observatory re-launched; consulting 
activities for roll-out of cross-border regions 
in Eastern Europe 
C C  EU 
1998 EUREGIO head nominated full-time head of 
AEBR 
C C  Local 
 AEBR elaborates working documents on 
behalf of EU Commission for follow-up 
version of Interreg programme  
T A  EU 
2004 Border regions included in the European 
Constitutional Treaty, as a result of lobbying 
activity by AEBR  
C C  EU 
 
Abbreviations: I: interactional, T: technical, C: cultural, P: political, A: analytical 
AEBR: Association of European Border Regions; CoE: Council of Europe; EU: European Union 
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Table 2:  Projects and skills in institutional entrepreneurship 
Project  Activities Skills  Outcome 
Interactional  Networking,  
Resource mobilization 
Organization building  
Political  Innovative 
organisational form  
Technical  Studying 
Analyzing 
Designing  
Analytical  Theorization of 
organizational form 
Cultural  Framing 
Propagating 
Advising 
Teaching  
Cultural  Diffusion of 
organizational form  
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Figure 1: Cross-border regions in Europe  
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Cumulative number of initiatives (source: Perkmann 2003, modified).  
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Figure 2: Projects types within different five-year periods  
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